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Abstract 
According to the artefactual theory of fiction, fictional characters are contingently existing abstract entities. One 
comparative advantage of artefactualism over their rivals is its conformity with our pre-theoretic views about the 
createdness of these entities. However, it is not entirely clear what it means to say that Sherlock Holmes, Anna 
Karenina and their likes are ʻcreated abstracta’. It is argued in this paper that one simple way to answer this ques-
tion is to explain the nature of fictional characters in terms of linguistic representation.  
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1 Introduction 
The first part of this study gave a relatively detailed review of the virtues of the artefactualist 
theory of literary characters. In this second part I will outline a representationalist variant of 
this theory. Section 2 introduces and analyses the notion of non-relational representation. On 
my view, without this notion one cannot properly understand what literary characters are. Fi-
nally, Section 3 draws some metatheoretical conclusions from the considerations presented in 
the first and second parts of this study. 
2 Fundamentals of a representationalist account of literary characters 
It would be certainly an interesting question of the historiography of the theory of fictionality 
why so many experts are reluctant to accept that literary characters are closely related, or per-
haps identical, to abstract linguistic constructions. To pursue this question would take us too 
far afield. But we can characterize the current research situation with the help of some illus-
trative examples. In my view, the aversion to abstract linguistic constructions is a corollary of 
a broader theoretical standpoint which may be rightfully called a ʻsimple-minded account of 
realism’. 
It is advisable to begin by quoting some relevant passages from the works of antirealists 
and then turn to the corresponding realist examples. Since the publication of his groundbreak-
ing monograph Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990), Walton is widely acknowledged as one of 
the leading proponents of the antirealist theory of fiction. According to Walton, literary dis-
course is to be understood in its entirety as an overarching game of make-believe or pretense. 
Authors and readers are co-operating players in the same game of make-believe, so the state-
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ments which are made in the course of playing the game are not to be taken seriously. Pretend 
statements involve only pretend commitments: the players behave, verbally, as if the entities 
mentioned or described by them were existing things. But in actual fact, pretend statements do 
not express propositions at all and there is nothing to which the participants of the discourse 
could be ontologically committed. Therefore, from the Waltonian point of view, a statement 
which implies apparent commitment to a fictional entity should not be taken at face value. To 
claim otherwise is to disregard the rules of an ongoing game. Artefactualists who think that 
characters are created artefacts are guilty of making the same error. It is worth quoting Wal-
ton’s opinion at length:  
Walt Disney did invent some things, certain animation techniques, for instance, and one can point out that 
a certain technique was invented by him. Committees, governments, and laws are cultural artifacts, and 
can be described as such. But to say that Donald Duck was “invented by Walt Disney” or that he “is a 
cultural artifact” is probably to say that there is no such thing, i.e. that Donald Duck-ish referring attempts 
fail. If Donald Duck is anything he is a duck (a talking duck); not an invention or a cultural artifact. Some 
concepts may be “empty;” the concept of Donald Duck (if there is such a thing) is one of them. But Don-
ald Duck himself is not a concept. (Walton 2015: 103) 
The quoted passage is a succinct summary of the critical attitude Walton had adopted towards 
fictional realism at numerous places in his oeuvre from the 1970s onwards. And as such it ex-
emplifies the typical contradictory features of that attitude. First, Walton is aware that he can-
not straightforwardly deny the existence of cultural artefacts. Indeed, it would be curious to 
suggest that such cultural inventions of the human mind as committees, governments, and 
laws are members of a natural kind. Second, he seems to be expressing his doubt concerning 
the artefactual status of fictional entities. Moreover, he seems to doubt that fictional entities 
have an ontology at all. In order to establish a categorical difference between the status of the-
se groups of entities – that is, between committees, governments, etc., on the one hand, and 
fictional characters on the other –, Walton offers a metalinguistic analysis. According to this 
analysis, if a speaker makes an existential statement about a character cN, she conveys the 
metalinguistic information that N cannot be employed in a referring use. 
One problem with this analysis is that in utterances of the form ʻN is F’ (where F is an ex-
istential predicate), the proper name N is typically used and not merely mentioned as the met-
alinguistic interpretation would require. To stick with the example of Donald Duck, it is im-
plausible to claim that the utterer of the sentence ʻDonald Duck is not real’ wants to convey 
nothing else than ʻʻDonald Duck’ is not a referring name’. As regards its default semantic 
reading, ʻis not real’ is not a purely metalinguistic predicate. Imagine a cognitive psychologist 
who remarks that visual space is not real. Presumably, she is much more interested in the 
mental construction of the visible properties of our immediate environment than in the refer-
ential profile of the expression ʻvisual space’. If she wants to inform us of her own interests 
correctly, then she must use that expression instead of mentioning it. This and similar cases 
indicate that Walton errs in thinking that an existential predicate like ʻis not real’ is equivalent 
with its metalinguistic cognate ʻis unable to refer’. 
A further problem is that the metalinguistic analysis does not directly support Walton’s 
distinction between genuine artefacts and fictional characters. Consider the following two 
statements: 
 
(1) The American Nobel Committee was founded by Jacques Ferrand and Albert Einstein. 
 
(2) Donald Duck was invented by Walt Disney. 
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Seen from the Waltonian perspective, the American Nobel Committee is an existing artefact. 
So the name ʻAmerican Nobel Committee’ functions as an ordinary referring expression in 
(1). This is not true of Donald Duck (or better: Donald Duck), since there is no such artefact. 
But then how should we interpret (2) in which the name ʻDonald Duck’ seems to occupy a re-
ferring position with respect to the transitive predicate ʻwas invented’? As already said, Wal-
ton’s proposal is that we should engage in a metalinguistic ascent. If this is done, then we can 
understand the utterer of (2) as attempting to express her doubt concerning the referential po-
tential of the name ʻDonald Duck’. That is, we can interpret (2) as a means for expressing a 
general metalinguistic thought according to which “Donald Duck-ish referring attempts fail”. 
If this were indeed the right approach to (2), then we would find ourselves in a very odd 
situation. We could easily say that there is a causal and/or historical relation between Jacques 
Ferrand, Albert Einstein and the American Nobel Committee, but we would be unable to say 
that there is a similar relation between Walt Disney and Donald Duck (or Donald Duck), be-
cause in the latter case we would be obliged to make a metalinguistic statement about our re-
ferring attempts. Although I have not gathered empirical evidence, I guess that ordinary 
speakers would draw a close analogue between (1) and (2). They would presumably agree that 
both statements can be viewed as true instances of the predicative schema ʻsomething was 
founded/invented by someone’. If such speakers were asked about the origin of Donald Duck, 
they would answer that it was invented by Walt Disney. They would not feel pressure to talk 
about issues of reference at all. And for this reason, they would reject the Waltonian analysis 
as misleading. 
Maybe I am wrong and ordinary speakers actually follow a metalinguistic strategy to set 
apart genuine artefacts from fictional characters. But now let us consider a second challenge 
for this analysis: 
 
(3) Donald Duck and the American Nobel Committee are artefacts. 
 
(3) would not pose any interpretative problem for artefactualists. They would say in a sober 
tone that Donald Duck and the American Nobel Committee are both products of the human 
mind and as such they are actually existing (abstract) entities. They would conclude, there-
fore, that (3) is to be regarded as a true statement. A Waltonian antirealist is in trouble, how-
ever, because she cannot provide a consistent reading of (3). While one component of the con-
junctive subject (Donald Duck) suggests the need for a metalinguistic ascent, the other com-
ponent (American Nobel Committee) calls for a literal reading. The possibility of a collective 
reading is blocked by this tension. Perhaps the solution would be to offer a distributive read-
ing for (3). But in this case, the distributive reading would be the wholly unacceptable 
ʻDonald Duck-ish referring attempts fail and the American Nobel Committee is an artefact’. 
One may conclude from this that the Waltonian interpretation of the artefactualist theory is 
not wholly adequate. But what follows in the quoted passage is even more peculiar. Walton 
claims there that if there is such an entity as Donald Duck, then it must be a talking duck, not 
an artefact. I am not sure I know how to understand this claim. Perhaps Walton thinks that if a 
character c is described or portrayed in a text as belonging to a natural kind K, then c is either 
one of the Ks, or it is nothing. This would explain why he excludes the possibility that Donald 
Duck is an artefact. (This would also explain why he denies the existence of characters. And 
he is certainly right about one thing: there are no talking ducks.) But it is misleading to sug-
gest – if this is what Walton is suggesting – that characters cannot be artefacts because fic-
tional prose works are typically not about abstract entities. We cannot detect a mismatch be-
tween the way a character is described and the way it exists. Even though Donald Duck is de-
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scribed as being a talking duck, it does not follow that there must be a language-external enti-
ty that corresponds to the description. Walton seems to get this wrong when he says that the 
concept of Donald Duck (if there is such a concept) may be empty, but Donald Duck himself 
is not a concept. I my view, appreciators of Walt Disney’s story may acquire and possess a 
Donald Duck-concept, provided that concepts are language-based entities; and, with certain 
provisos, we can say that this is an empty concept. But if we agree on that, then it is not clear 
to me what is the point in adding that Donald Duck himself is not a concept. What is the in-
tended meaning of ʻhimself’ in this context? Artefactualists and other abstract realists do not 
need to think that Donald Duck has the same identity and essence as real ducks in the back-
yard. The situation is the same as in the case of a toy duck. A toy duck is not a duck; it is a toy 
that resembles a duck. If Walton thinks otherwise, then he misconstrues the standpoint of his 
opponents. 
 The above-quoted Waltonian passage gives us an example of the phenomenon which I 
have called the simple-minded account of realism. Walton assumed that on the realist’s view 
the way a character is described or represented differs from the way it exists. Note, however, 
that not only leading antirealists are of this opinion. Goodman (2004) is a convinced defender 
of the artefactualist theory, but what he says about this issue seems to be quite close in spirit 
to the interpretation offered by Walton. He writes: 
I think that as an author begins the storytelling process, and as she begins to regularly associate various 
predicates with various names, an entity gradually begins to take shape (so to speak) – an (abstract) entity 
that the name denotes (in some contexts) that exemplifies various properties-in-a-story. (Goodman 2004: 
144) 
Goodman expresses his agreement with the claim that characters are language-independent 
abstracta. He says that fictional names denote abstracta (in some contexts). Given Goodman’s 
adherence to the artefactualist theory, the bracketed qualification is to be taken as referring to 
extra-fictional contexts. For example, seen from the perspective of literary criticism, Hamlet 
can be classified as a contingently existing abstract entity. In other contexts, contends Good-
man, this very same entity exemplifies properties which are not typical of abstracta. Although 
Hamlet is an abstractum, it exemplifies properties typical of concreta in the story of the play 
Hamlet. That is, seen from the perspective of Shakespeare’s story, Hamlet can be classified as 
a flesh-and-blood person. There is a further questionable point in the quoted sentence. It is 
said that in the course of the storytelling process an abstract entity gradually takes shape. The 
reference to the gradual nature of this process is of minor importance in the present context. 
The significant part of the sentence is that which suggests the language-external status of the 
originating entity. As other fellow artefactualists, Goodman holds that abstract fictional enti-
ties take shape due to the mental activities of their authors. This is one of the factors on which 
their existence necessarily depends. The storytelling process manifests itself in a set of sen-
tence tokens which compose, in the end, a particular manuscript. This embodies a second kind 
of dependence factor. Goodman remarks, later is his study, that to bring into existence a de-
pendent entity is merely a matter of bringing into existence its dependence factors. And this 
cannot be conceived otherwise than bringing into existence an entity which is dependent on 
but external to its dependence factors. This is precisely what the quoted sentence suggests. 
There are other supporters of the artefactualists theory who seem to follow this line of rea-
soning. But instead of listing more examples of this thought-pattern, I would like to make 
some reflections on the lesson we can draw. 
The first is that it is not quite clear why the simple-minded account of realism became so 
attractive for all participants of the debate. Perhaps the impetus behind this account is that un-
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til now no one has attempted to provide explicit arguments why fictional entities cannot be 
identical to linguistic constructions. I know only of one such attempt. Thomasson (2015b: 38) 
claims that the view according to which propositions are linguistic entities entails that they 
are, in some sense, subjective. Since, on her view, propositions and fictional characters are 
equally minimal, I suspect that Thomasson thinks her verdict to be correct for characters too. I 
find this claim wanting because of the absence of a suggestion that would explain in what the 
alleged subjectivity of such publicly available linguistic entities as sentence tokens consists. 
The second reflection is that, in spite of its popularity, the simple-minded account is unten-
able because it entails an unnecessary reduplication of the object of inquiry. Fictional entities 
are accessible to us by our reading experiences. The textual level of fictional prose works 
comprises all the entities at which our attention is directed. We are confronted with linguistic 
representations at this level, and we should not forget that these representations are full-
fledged abstracta on their own. Therefore, if we want to know what kind of abstracta fictional 
characters, places and events are, it is better to focus on this basic level of literary discourse. 
Representations have a kind of explanatory priority in this respect. And as we recognize this, 
we must also recognize the unwarranted and redundant assumptions behind the talk which 
takes fictional entities to be self-standing cultural artefacts or other sorts of non-linguistic ab-
stracta. 
Evidently, it would be folly to try to define fictionalia in terms of linguistic representations 
without providing a sufficiently detailed explanation for the relevant concept of linguistic rep-
resentation. 
It is customary to say that fictional characters are described by their authors as having a 
certain set of properties. Sherlock Holmes is described by Conan Doyle as being, among other 
things, a clever detective and Tolstoy describes Anna Karenina as being, among other things, 
a passionate lover. For most theoretical purposes, this manner of speaking is harmless. 
But when we are concerned with the way in which Holmes and Karenina exist, we have to 
proceed carefully. The problem with ʻdescribe’ is that it is a success verb. Success verbs like 
ʻknow’ or ʻremember’ require that certain epistemic or semantic conditions be met. For ex-
ample, we cannot know that Tilda Swinton is an actress without having successfully collected 
factual informations about her personality. We cannot remember that she acted in the movie 
We Need to Talk About Kevin without successfully reconstructing our past cinema experienc-
es. In general, in order to know or remember that o is F, we must be related to o in an appro-
priate manner, where appropriate relatedness means an external condition which cannot be 
satisfied by reflection alone. Ditto for ʻdescribe’. When a witness wants to describe verbally 
the physical attributes of the person she saw at a robbery scene, she must successfully collect 
her past visual impressions. She may say that the person she had seen was taller than an aver-
age man, wore a black trousers with a green polo shirt, etc. Under such a circumstance, these 
descriptive phrases are used relationally. The witness thinks that there is a particular person 
who satisfies the applied descriptive predicates ʻtaller than an average man’ and ʻwore a black 
trousers with a green polo shirt’. If she has been related to that person in an externally appro-
priate manner, then she is certainly right in this. 
I hope it is clear from the discussion of the ontological status of artefacts thus far, that fic-
tional characters cannot be described in this relational manner. Nevertheless, we may continue 
to use the ʻcN is described in work W’ figure of speech to refer to the way cN is given to us. 
When we say that the novel A Study in Scarlet describes Holmes as being a certain way, we 
merely emphasize that we are acquainted with that character by reading the novel. As atten-
tive readers, we get to know that Holmes smokes a pipe, but it would be wrong to think that 
we are thereby externally related to a pipe-smoker. Such descriptive predicates as ʻpipe-
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smoker’ or ʻclever detective’ cannot be used with respect to Holmes relationally. It is obvious 
why. There are no abstract entities, of whatever kind, that could have properties like these. 
Because of its limited applicability, the verb ʻdescribe’ does not entirely suit our present 
theoretical concerns. ʻDescribe’ has some close synonyms which seem to exhibit the same 
problematic features. It might be said, alternatively, that a character cN is portrayed in a work 
W. But ʻportray’ belongs to the same family of verbs as ʻdescribe’. Used as a predicate, it im-
plies relationality. Consider the following statement: Daniel Quinn is portrayed as being thir-
ty-five years old in the novel City of Glass. As above, one possible reading of this statement is 
that the text of the novel informs us that a character, Daniel Quinn, is thirty-five years old. I 
think many of us would be willing to consider this as a natural and acceptable interpretation. 
On the second reading, the portrayal of the character is taken to establish an external relation 
to a thirty-five years old individual called Daniel Quinn. Again, this cannot be a correct inter-
pretation because of the abstractness of the character. The same limitation in applicability 
holds for other candidate synonyms such as ʻdepict’ and ʻdelineate’. 
In this regard, ʻrepresent’ gains a significant advantage over ʻdescribe’ and its kindred 
verbs. On the one hand, ʻrepresent’ has a theoretical use similar to that of ʻdescribe’. To say 
that cN is represented in work W seems close to saying that cN is given to us by the elements 
of the textual machinery of W. In the statement ʻHolmes is described in the novel A Study in 
Scarlet as a clever detective’, the verb ʻdescribed’ can be replaced salva sensu by the verb 
ʻrepresented’. On the other hand – and this is a particularly important point – ʻrepresent’ 
should not be necessarily conceived as a success verb. At the very least, it has a theoretical 
use where the standard epistemic and semantic conditions of success verbs are not operative. 
Goodman (1968) was among the firsts to argue that ʻrepresent’ occasionally behaves as an 
unbreakable one-place predicate. He was concerned primarily with issues of pictorial repre-
sentation, but his observations are relevant for the linguistic case too. Many artistic pictures 
represent existing objects, says Goodman, but there are also pictures that do not represent 
anything. A picture of a unicorn is one of these cases. Yet to say this sounds a bit paradoxical. 
What could it mean that a picture does not represent anything but it is a picture of a unicorn? 
If ʻrepresent’ is taken to be a two-place predicate with an argument place for objects, then the 
paradox cannot be resolved. We ought to talk about a particular object and attribute properties 
to it, when we want to talk about a representation. A way out is to recognize that a picture rep-
resenting a unicorn is a unicorn-representing-picture, or, for short, a unicorn-picture, not a 
picture of or about a unicorn. This helps mitigate the paradoxical effects of the statement that 
although there are no unicorns, there are pictures which represent them. 
An additional advantage of this observation is that it allows for distinguishing between dif-
ferent objectless or empty pictures. Neither a unicorn-picture nor a dragon-picture can repre-
sent objects, because there are no such objects as unicorns and dragons. But a well-informed 
interpreter would never mistake a unicorn-picture for a dragon-picture. Of course, in spite of 
their emptiness, these are different pictorial representations. As perceivers, we routinely sort 
distinct unicorn-pictures into one group; we are pretty sure that Raphael’s painting Portrait of 
a Lady with a Unicorn and the cover of The Unicorn Coloring Book contains one and the 
same mythological figure. The same holds for grouping dragon-pictures. We know very well 
what we are seeking when we search for dragon representing pictures. 
The key point in Goodman’s analysis is, nevertheless, that representations of o should be 
categorically distinguished from o-representations. If R is a representation of o, then o exists 
and R represents o. Let RTS be a picture of Tilda Swinton. Then RTS represents an actually ex-
isting individual. In talking about the relation between the picture and the individual, we use 
ʻrepresent’ as a success verb. That is, RTS succeeds as a representation only if it is externally 
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related to the relevant individual and it is related to that individual in an appropriate manner. 
But R may be an o-representation even if there is no such object as o. Let Ru be a unicorn pic-
ture. Then Ru counts as a unicorn-representation. In contrast to the previous case, ʻrepresent’ 
is used here as a one-place predicate. To be a (successful) unicorn-representation, Ru does not 
need to be related to any particular object. But one might then wonder in virtue of which is Ru 
a unicorn-representation at all. Why is it not instead a dragon-representation? Goodman 
would say, I think, that all that matters here is that Ru has the prototypical features which are 
characteristic of other unicorn-representations. That is, if Ru is picturing a horse-like animal 
with a large spiralling horn on its forehead, then it is probably a good candidate for being a 
unicorn-representation. 
Whatever importance we may attribute to Goodman’s conceptual apparatus, he was cer-
tainly not an early proponent of the artefactualist theory. Goodman repeatedly says that there 
are no unicorns and he also explicitly rejects the existence of fictional entities.1 According to 
him, engagement in mythological pictures does not involve commitment to entities which 
have a distinctive ontological status. In this regard, his opinion is much closer to the stand-
point of present-day antirealists. So, if we tried to apply his insight to literary works, we 
would be faced with a difficulty. Goodman claims that a unicorn-picture does not represent 
anything. It is a picture with null denotation. However, in spite of its emptiness, we recognize 
it as a unicorn-picture. Why? Because we see it as if it were a picture of a horse-like animal 
which has a large spiralling horn on its forehead. If we applied this approach to the literary 
case, we would get the following result. The proper name ʻSherlock Holmes’ is an empty 
name that does not represent anything. It is a name with null denotation. In spite of this, we 
recognize sentences containing ʻHolmes’ as Holmes-representations. The question is, again, 
why this is so. Given what he said about empty pictures, Goodman’s answer would be this: 
we take the sentence ʻHolmes smokes a pipe’ as a Holmes-representation because we under-
stand it as if it were a representation of a person-like entity who (or which) smokes a pipe. 
Goodman cannot deny that the sentence ʻHolmes smokes a pipe’ appears to attribute a proper-
ty to a person. But from his point of view, this is what it is: an appearance. Since he rejects 
the existence of Holmes, he must assume that ʻHolmes’ behaves in such sentences as if it 
were a name of a person-like entity. This extra assumption is needed because otherwise he 
could not say that we may collect all Holmes-representations into one single group. Holmes-
representations must have some common features in virtue of which they are Holmes-
representations and not, say, Karenina-representations. 
This Goodmanian assumption is questionable for two reasons. First, it seems implausible 
to contend that readers of the novel A Study in Scarlet process and understand the name 
ʻHolmes’ as if it were designed to seemingly represent a person-like entity. Those who engage 
in the text are compelled to interpret this name as a conventional device for person representa-
tion, independently of whatever they think about the ontological status of Holmes. It is evi-
dent for everyone, I think, that ʻHolmes’ is used in a subject position in such a sentence as 
ʻHolmes smokes a pipe’. And the property attributed to the subject mentioned in that sentence 
– i.e., the property of smoking a pipe – is clearly a property of persons. If you have reserva-
tions against this being called a personal property, then consider the sentence ʻHolmes was 
certainly not a difficult man to live with’. Here, it is explicitly indicated that ʻHolmes’ is used 
as a person representation in the novel. The explanatory predicate ʻman’ dispels all doubts to 
the contrary. Given this, I find it hard to imagine why should we associate the textual occur-
rences of the name with such a curious thing as a person-like entity. Perceiving one-horned 
                                                
1 See Goodman (1968: 21, 22, 30). 
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horse-like figures is necessary for recognizing unicorn-representations, but one does not need 
to apprehend person-like entities for recognizing Holmes-representations. ʻHolmes’ is no less 
a person representation than an ordinary name like ʻSwinton’. Which is not to say, of course, 
that ʻHolmes’ is a representation of a person. Common sense intuitions seem to converge on 
this point. Second, a person-like entity is not only a curious thing, but also an ontological 
monster. The term ʻperson’, like other natural kind words, is often thought of as having vague 
application conditions. This is not particularly troubling for our present account, since we can 
understand the term in its most general sense, according to which persons are concrete human 
beings. Even though the boundaries of the term ʻperson’ vary strongly between different met-
aphysical frameworks, this does not tell us much about the application conditions of the other 
term. But one thing is clear: person-like entities cannot be human beings, since ʻHolmes’ 
would then behave in Conan Doyle’s novel as if it were a name of a human being and Good-
man excludes this possibility. Nor can they be instances of a non-natural kind, for an analo-
gous problem would then arise, namely that ʻHolmes’ would behave as if it were a name of an 
artefact. Goodman’s scepticism concerning the existence of fictional entities excludes this 
possibility too. This does not mean that we should deny tout court the metaphysical possibil-
ity of person-like entities. The lesson is more specific to the ontology of literary works. I want 
merely to claim that in the context of a literary ontology which centres around the concept of 
representation we cannot have a clear idea of what person-like entities are. And so the analy-
sis which reveals how “empty” artistic pictures work cannot be directly applied in the investi-
gation of fictional prose works. 
This is a drawback of Goodman’s account. But he was surely right in stressing that for cer-
tain theoretical purposes ʻrepresent’ is analysable as an intransitive one-place predicate. For-
tunately, there are alternative frameworks which utilize the Goodmanian distinction between 
cases of representations of o and cases of o-representations and to which we can turn in argu-
ing for the non-relational nature of fictional representations. 
One of these frameworks is elaborated by Burge in his Origins of Objectivity (2010). It is 
worth discussing briefly some passages of this book, for we find in them a comprehensive ac-
count of the phenomenon of representation. Burge interprets ʻrepresentation’ as a generic term 
which covers various sorts of human intentionality. By being connected with psychological 
(i.e. intentional) states, the events of perception, cognition, and language use all include repre-
sentations. The latter is of most interest to us here. 
Linguistic representation has two subtypes: reference and indication. Reference, claims 
Burge, is both a relation between expression tokens and extra-linguistic entities, and a func-
tion of a mental state or event to establish the reference relation. Consider a conversational 
situation in which the participants talk about the habits of Arnold Schwarzenegger. Imagine 
that in this situation someone utters the sentence ʻArnold smokes a pipe’. By focusing on the 
relational aspect of reference, we may say that the token name ʻArnold’ is related here to the 
person Arnold Schwarzenegger. On the other hand, in attending to the functional aspect of 
reference, we may say that the utterer of the sentence is engaged in reference by using the to-
ken name ʻArnold’. This picture might be familiar to many readers, since Burge’s dual-aspect 
approach to reference corresponds well to the standard distinction between semantic reference 
and pragmatic reference. 
In contrast to names and other singular expressions, predicates are not devices of reference. 
When it is used as a predicate, ʻclever’ does not refer to anything. Instead, it indicates the 
property of being clever. In general, predicates indicate properties which can be attributed to 
appropriate entities. Thus, reference and indication can be seen as performing a complemen-
tary function. Suppose someone utters the sentence ʻArnold is clever’ in the above-mentioned 
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situation. Burge would say that in this sentence ʻclever’ functions to attribute what it indi-
cates, that is, it attributes the property of being clever to the entity to which ʻArnold’ refers. 
And given that ʻArnold’ is used here to refer to the person Arnold Schwarzenegger, the sen-
tence can be taken as stating that Arnold Schwarzenegger is clever. Again, this is broadly 
what standard theories of predicative statements contend. 
On Burge’s view, the primary function of linguistic representation is property attribution. 
A particular linguistic item represents something as being so-and-so, or as having such-and-
such properties, if it represents something by an appropriate type of representation. In order to 
represent Arnold Schwarzenegger as being clever, speakers have to use tokens of the clever-
type representation. Of course, ʻclever-type representation’ does not mean a representation 
that is clever. It is instead a representation type, individuated in terms of the predicate 
ʻclever’. 
The really interesting cases are those in which reference and indication come apart. We 
have mentioned earlier that scientific vocabularies may contain occasionally empty terms. For 
example, the expression ʻphlogiston’ was introduced into the chemical vocabulary of the 
1700s without having a worldly referent. Phlogiston was characterized by its discoverer as a 
chemical substance which is released into the air on burning. But as it turned out shortly 
thereafter, the proposed theory was based on erroneous background assumptions. ʻPhlogiston’ 
was (and is) an empty term. Thus, by uttering the sentence ʻphlogiston is released in burning’ 
something is indicated (a release), but nothing is represented (because ʻphlogiston’ lacks a 
referent). But in spite of the fact that nothing is represented as phlogiston, the utterance in-
volves a phlogiston-type of representation. 
At this juncture, I can imagine an objection taking the following form. It is true that refer-
ence and indication must cooperate in successful representations. It is also true that scientists 
occasionally introduce into their theories empty terms, for various reasons. But the idea of 
empty representations is obscure, to say the least. If there is no referent for a term t, then t is 
empty, and empty terms are not representational devices in any sense of the word. So the 
claim that there is a t-type representation involves a kind of conceptual incoherence. 
The objection can be averted, however, by pointing out that phlogiston-like terms may 
have representational content in spite of their emptiness. To see how this is possible we need 
to take a look at the constitutive functions of linguistic representations. One such function 
consists in individuating and tracking intentional states. When speakers utter sentences in-
volving the name ʻArnold’, they indicate a particular person as being a certain way. If Arnold 
is a concrete entity, utterances of ʻArnold is F’, ʻArnold is F1’, ʻArnold is F2’, etc., attribute 
what they indicate. They represent Arnold as having the properties F, F1, F2, etc., even across 
different utterance contexts. Because of this, one can regard ʻArnold’ and the set {F, F1, F2, 
…} as jointly individuating a type of intentional state. If certain contextual and pragmatic 
conditions are satisfied, an utterance involving ʻArnold’ makes explicit that the speaker is in 
this type of state. Other speakers recognize this: they acknowledge that the communicative in-
tentions of their conversational partners are directed towards one and the same entity. In co-
herently evolving conversations this piece of common knowledge remains stable and predict-
able.  
One other constitutive function of linguistic representations is that they embody inferential 
capacities. Speakers may attribute many properties to an indicated entity, and a particular 
property may be attributed to an entity with using different predicates. As regards the proper-
ties of Arnold, speakers have many options. They may utter attributive sentences like ʻArnold 
is tall’, ʻArnold is a pipe-smoker’, and so forth. These are representations which are connected 
to each other by inferential and other logical or semantic relations. For example, from the 
 
 
Zoltán Vecsey: A representationalist account of literary characters. Part II: Representationalism 
Argumentum 12 (2016), 333-350 
Debreceni Egyetemi Kiadó 
342 
above two utterances, one can derive the conclusion that Arnold is a tall pipe-smoker. And 
similarly, if it turns out that Arnold can be represented as being taller than 180 cm, one can 
safely conclude that Arnold can be represented as being taller than 70 inches. 
Speakers individuate and track both their own intentional states and the intentional states 
of others by referring and indicating. In Burges’s jargon, a t-type state specifies an attribute F 
if and only if it represents t as being F.2 And given that speakers may refer to and indicate t in 
a number of ways, t may be represented as being F in a number of ways. These ways of refer-
ring and indicating can be said to be the contents of linguistic representations. 
Note that Burge’s account of representational content follows from a functional analysis of 
referring and indicating. On this account, representational contents can be construed without 
mentioning the content-determining role of extra-linguistic factors. Of course, if t is not emp-
ty, t-type states represent t successfully, and the (representational) content of an utterance ʻt is 
F’ can be evaluated as veridical. Note also that the functional analysis is insensitive to the dif-
ferences between the semantic behaviour of non-empty terms and empty terms. While an ut-
terance of ʻArnold is tall’ may end up being a successful and veridical representation, utter-
ances of ʻSherlock is tall’ are doomed to be unsuccessful and not veridical. But the difference 
in successfulness and veridicality does not touch upon the functional similarity of these utter-
ances. Both can be seen as fulfilling the function of individuating a certain type of representa-
tional state. And, a fortiori, both can be seen as conveying a certain type of representational 
content. 
It is important to stress, again, that when we say that utterances involving empty terms are 
capable of conveying representational content, then we do not want to capture the specifica-
tions of content in an externalist manner. As Goodman already recognized, representations of 
objects, if successful, should be treated as possessing externally determined contents. Object-
representations, on the other hand, can be successful even if they lack such kind of content de-
termination. Now we are in a position to transfer this observation to the linguistic case. If t is 
an empty term, t-type states are representational and utterances involving t are to be thought 
of as t-representations. These empty states and empty utterances does not differ functionally 
from non-empty states and non-empty utterances. But in contrast to the latter, they convey 
representational content without being related to external representata. Instances of the phlo-
giston-type representation possess a kind of content that can enter in inferential, logical and 
semantic relations with other contents. We may say, for example, that the idea of phlogiston 
and the idea of ether are equally products of mistaken scientific theorizing. This is a familiar 
way of talking in which the empty terms ʻphlogiston’ and ʻether’ are used in a contentful but 
non-relational manner. 
Speakers individuate their own intentional states by engaging in acts of referring and indi-
cation. The representational content of these states seems to resemble meanings – at least in 
certain respects. Empty names cannot indicate entities, but this does not entail that such 
names lack representational content; quite the contrary: they represent, although non-
relationally. Enthusiasts of detective novels easily recognize the difference between a 
Holmes-type representation and a Maigret-type representation. (You can try to deceive them, 
but you will end up losing.) Similarly, empty terms do not refer to entities, yet they are not 
completely devoid of meaning. Although ʻphlogiston’ and ʻether’ have the same null exten-
sion, they surely differ in meaning. Consider the following pair of sentences: (a) ʻPhlogiston 
was introduced by Georg Stahl’, and (b) ʻEther was introduced by Georg Stahl’. I think it is 
clear that informed speakers would assent to (a), but dissent to (b). If this is so, then there 
                                                
2 See Burge (2010: 37). 
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must be a non-extensional aspect of meaning that can be made responsible for this attitudinal 
difference. Moreover, seen from the perspective of language use, representations and mean-
ings have the same ontological standing. Both are publicly available and shareable abstract 
entities. And given their common sociocultural origin, both can be categorized as contingently 
existing artefacts. At the same time, meanings have some structural or behavioural features 
that representational contents seem to lack. Just to mention one, some indexical expressions 
are used in a token-reflexive way. When the first person pronoun ʻI’ is used in this way, it has 
the meaning ʻthe utterer of this token’. I believe that representations, be they relational or non-
relational, cannot carry such token-reflexive contents because they are not decomposable 
along the character/content dimension that plays a fundamental role in the analysis of indexi-
cals. For this and other related reasons, representations are not to be identified with meanings. 
This is only a side issue, though, because the main point of interest here is a plausible defi-
nition of a notion of linguistic representation which does not implicitly involve a semantic (or 
epistemic) relation to represented entities. The above discussions have shown that Goodman’s 
insight pertaining to the content of pictorial representations has a much wider application than 
he had originally conceived of it. As we have seen, thanks to Burge, ʻrepresent’ can be used 
as an intransitive predicate in the theory of mental states, and even in the theory of linguistic 
content. The lesson we can learn from the intransitive uses of this predicate is that referential 
failure does not necessarily entail representational failure. The relevant notion of representa-
tion may then be defined in the following way: 
 
Non-Relational Linguistic Representation (NRLR): A linguistic item, t, qualifies as a non-
relational representation if and only if the following conditions are jointly satisfied: (i) to-
kens of t are capable of conveying representational content in utterances which purport to 
refer and indicate, (ii) t lacks a language-external representatum, and (iii) t-representations 
are publicly available and shareable entities. 
 
Condition (i) is required in order to exclude extreme cases in which referential failure entails 
representational failure. Imagine that someone fills in the formula ʻThe  ̲ ̲ ̲ ̲ is here’ with closed 
eyes so that the result is ʻThe t*9C®™n is here’. Obviously, since the character sequence 
ʻt*9C®™n’ has been typed in without a communicative intention, it will neither refer to an 
entity nor convey or express a representational content. Because of the threatening possibility 
of cases like this, it is reasonable to restrict our definition to such utterances where t has a 
chance to convey a representational content. 
Satisfying condition (ii) ensures that t’s representational content is not of a relational kind. 
Utterances of t purport to refer to entities but are necessarily unsuccessful in that attempt.3 
Our definition must make it clear that this is so not because of some pragmatic error or other 
kind of communicative failure, but because t lacks a representatum. 
The last condition, condition (iii), concerns the epistemic accessibility of t-representations. 
Notice that t is a vehicle type for constructing natural language representations. It is plausible 
to suppose that t is part of an internal code; perhaps it is an item in a mental lexicon with rich 
causal and computational connections, or it is a symbol in a language of thought with a com-
positional syntax and semantics. Acts of referring and indication involve tokens of such ab-
stract vehicle types. Although utterances contain perceivable tokens of t (i.e., they make pub-
licly available, and thus shareable, the type t), it is important to see that t-representations 
                                                
3 According to the apt remark of Burge, “[r]epresentation is rather like shooting. Some shots do not hit any-
thing, but they remain shootings” (Burge 2010: 45). 
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themselves are not perceivable linguistic entities. Concrete particulars – acoustical signals in 
the air or ink marks on a sheet of paper – are not apt to be regarded as representations. Some-
one’s admiring Holmes is not admiring acoustical signals or ink marks. The right thing to say 
is that uttered and written tokens serve as triggers for their corresponding mental 
items/symbols. I do not want to suggest that the complex problem posed by the type-token re-
lationship is so easily solvable; but, for our present purposes, it is enough to note that tokens 
are needed to register that a particular speaker intends to convey a t-representation. When 
speakers produce and perceive utterances they register unique tokens which are unrepeatable 
spatiotemporal entities, but t-representations are registered at the type-level, and because of 
this they have to be categorized as repeatable abstract entities. Repeatability guarantees that 
the spatiotemporal contingency of utterances does not set limits to the epistemic accessibility 
of t-representations. 
With (NRLR) at hand, we can now turn our critique of the simple-minded account of real-
ism into a constructive proposal. The aim is not, of course, to rule out the artefactualist theory 
of fictional characters as completely misguided. I think that the Thomassonian approach is 
much more plausible and easier to defend than other realist approaches to characters. So my 
proposal is that we should rethink whether characters – and fictionalia in general – exist in the 
way Thomassonian artefactualists think they do. That is, we should rethink what does it exact-
ly mean to say that fictional characters, places and events are created abstract artefacts. I con-
tend, not surprisingly, that all of these entities are at bottom linguistic constructions to which 
we have epistemic access only via our ordinary reading experiences. If we take (NRLR) as a 
conceptual guide, we can provide a definite answer to the question concerning the nature of 
these linguistic constructions. The answer, in short, is that the individuals we found in our 
reading experiences and the events we apprehend in interpreting texts of literary fiction are 
nothing else than sets of non-relational representations. 
3 Some closing remarks about the metatheoretical aspects of the proposal 
Since our representational account of fictional characters is a linguistically motivated hypoth-
esis, we should briefly reflect on the role of data on which our theoretical claims rest. 
In recent years, Kertész and Rákosi have elaborated a metatheoretical model for linguistic 
research which is relevant in this regard (Kertész & Rákosi 2012, 2014a,b). Some parts of 
Kertész and Rákosi’s work are especially enlightening for the present proposal, so it is worth 
reviewing the basic structure of their model. 
The first thing to note is that Kertész and Rákosi conceive data as pieces of information.4 
But not all pieces of information can function as datum for a hypothesis. For them to play this 
role, it is essential that they possess a certain degree of plausibility when entering the process 
of theory development. This means that a given piece of information counts as a datum just in 
case it has a positive plausibility value originating from some direct source. In the case of di-
rect sources, the plausibility value of the information in question has to be evaluated with re-
spect to the reliability of the source. For instance, if one regards the theoretician’s intuition as 
a highly reliable source of information, then intuitive judgements about linguistic expressions 
have to be assigned a relatively high plausibility value. Or, if one thinks of written corpora as 
having only a low degree of reliability, then one should attach low plausibility values to the 
                                                
4 In fact, they think that pieces of information are available for us typically in the form of statements but this 
precisification is not crucial here. 
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pieces of information that stem from this kind of source. In most areas of linguistic research, 
degrees of plausibility are measured and determined by convention. In order to improve the 
efficacy of their research, adherents of a particular trend or school often adopt a consensual 
view concerning the plausibility ranking of alternative data sources. 
However, data may originate also from indirect sources. When a datum stems from an in-
direct source, its plausibility value is measured and determined on the basis of other pieces of 
information. Typically, this happens when data are generated by plausible inferences. At cer-
tain phases of theory development, the epistemic criteria for making sound logical inferences 
cannot be always fully satisfied. These are situations in which one ought to take into consid-
eration some unformalisable features of the inferences one wishes to draw. One might consid-
er, for example, the plausibility values of the premises of a particular inference and one might 
also weigh in the sources from which these values are drawn. In this way, one can make infer-
ences that contain premises which have some intermediate plausibility value instead of being 
genuinely true or false. Conclusions of these “uncertain” inferences have the same features, 
that is, they are not genuinely true or false but only to a certain extent plausible. Thus, when 
one considers the conclusion of a plausible inference as a datum, then the plausibility value of 
that datum should be calculated on the basis of the plausibility values of the premises and oth-
er relevant properties of the inference.5 
From this it follows that the notion of datum cannot be interpreted solely in terms of in-
formation content. According to Kertész and Rákosi’s approach, the structure of data consists 
of two components: one of them is a piece of information, the other is a plausibility value 
which stems from a direct or indirect source. 
Yet it is also worth noting that Kertész and Rákosi do not regard data as theory-
independent and unquestionable starting points for the construction of linguistic models. In-
stead they hold that data are entities that are basically uncertain, fallible and revisable. They 
inherit these properties from the sources with which they are associated. Therefore, in contrast 
to standard truth conditional views, data are regarded here not as facts, but as more or less re-
liable “truth-candidates”. Nevertheless, it is not wrong to say that data are in a certain sense 
‘given’ like facts since they receive a plausibility value from direct sources, that is, their ini-
tial plausibility is judged not with the help of inferences constructed within an argumentation 
process but directly on the basis of the reliability of their source.6 
Accordingly, for something to be a datum does not mean to have a stable, once-for-all sta-
tus. Kertész and Rákosi argue for this in the following way: 
If the reliability of a data source is called into question, then the usability of this source as well as the 
plausibility of the statements originating from it have to be re-evaluated. This means that information 
concerning the reliability of the source and the relationship between the source and the statements stem-
ming from it have to be integrated into the argumentation process. In this way the data stemming from 
this source will lose their data status (but not necessarily their plausibility). (Kertész & Rákosi 2012: 176) 
The first sentence in the passage can be read as an explanation of why data may vary in their 
plausibility values. In principle, any argumentation process may be extended to take new in-
formations into account. If they have been gathered from relevant sources and have positive 
plausibility values, these informations may function as new data for the development of a giv-
en theory. On the other hand, the newly acquired data may have a potential to call into ques-
                                                
5 The notion of evidence can be defined in terms of plausible inference: a datum is evidence with respect to 
some hypothesis if it is a premise of a plausible inference which makes that hypothesis plausible. For more 
on this, see Kertész & Rákosi (2012: 178–185) and (2014b: 45–46). 
6 Cf. Kertész & Rákosi (2012: 175). 
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tion the reliability of certain data sources already used in the process of argumentation. This 
might happen when a new datum affects directly and negatively the reliability of another 
source, or when it renders an extant data source irrelevant to the problem actually discussed. 
For these reasons, any piece of information may change its status and reliability as the process 
of research progresses. Seen from this metatheoretical perspective, linguistic theory develop-
ment is a dynamic process in which pieces of information are – or can be – constantly re-
evaluated with respect to their plausibility values. 
What is then the function of data in linguistic theories? The answer Kertész and Rákosi 
provide to this question is that the function of data is to supply plausibility values to theories. 
When a given piece of information acquires the status of datum in a linguistic theory, it can be 
used to determine the plausibility of other pieces of information with the help of plausible in-
ferences. This leads to cycles of argumentation where a particular information is often evalu-
ated from different perspectives. Such argumentation cycles can also occur between rival the-
ories either because they may judge the initial plausibility value of informational units differ-
ently, or because they may accept different forms of plausible inferences as legitimate. 
Let us take stock. Kertész and Rákosi’s metatheoretical model contains at least three in-
sights that are pertinent to the topic of the present paper. These are the following:7 
 
1) The role of plausibility in linguistic theory development. The linguistic model of plausibil-
ity reinterprets the standard notion of datum and regards it as an effective means of theory de-
velopment. Although data may be thought of, in a certain sense, as given, they do not have 
such a secure epistemological status as facts. Quite the contrary, their basic property is their 
uncertainty. Apart from cases that one can justly call extreme, data do not constitute true start-
ing points for theoretical reasoning. Instead, they are more or less reliable truth-candidates. 
The model interprets this type of uncertainty as plausibility. Accordingly, it can be claimed 
that the primary function of data is to introduce plausibility values into linguistic theories. 
 
2) Status and handling of data. Data in linguistic theories are not only uncertain, they are also 
fallible and revisable. They are to be recognized as having a fallible status because any claim 
one can make about them can be disputed. This is a consequence of the fact that data are es-
sentially theory- and problem-dependent. One can propose a hypothesis that assigns a positive 
plausibility value to a given piece of information, pi, if pi stems from a source which has been 
acknowledged to be reliable. An advocate of a rival hypothesis may reject this decision by ar-
guing that the data source in question is not capable to make pi plausible. This does not neces-
sarily lead to an impasse since both decisions can be revised by extending the debate with 
new pieces of information. If this has been done, one should set up an argumentation cycle in 
which old and new decisions can be evaluated in a coordinated manner. ʻCoordination’ is in-
tended to mean here not only the summation of the actually available informational units but 
also the examination of their consistency. The final aim of this process is to elaborate a theo-
retical context where the reliability of the contested data sources can be compared so that a 
tentative resolution of the initial dispute can be achieved. 
 
3) Open-endedness. Modelling data as uncertain, fallible and revisable has an implication that 
concerns the prospects and limitations of linguistic research in general. If linguistic research is 
to be thought of as a process in which data, plausible inferences and hypotheses are continu-
ously re-evaluated, then object-scientific questions can never be answered in a conclusive 
                                                
7 Cf. Kertész & Rákosi (2012: 254-255 ) and (2014a: 5-7). 
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way. Or, to put this less powerfully, it seems that for most object-scientific questions only 
provisional answers can be offered. The metatheoretical model reveals that object-scientific 
problems have usually more than one acceptable solution. Overall consensus concerning re-
search results is very rarely obtained since all disputants ought to check and revise their 
standpoint continuously through the re-evaluation process of plausible argumentation. To re-
peat, linguistic research does not start with genuinely true formulas and theorems from which 
sound inferences can be formed. In most cases, starting points are based on insecure epistemic 
ground. Strictly speaking, the opening arguments of linguistic theories are not true but merely 
candidates for being true. Even though obvious uncertainties are eliminated step by step as the 
research process progresses, one should always expect a certain amount of epistemic insecuri-
ty. Therefore, at a particular phase of the research, adherents of a given theory must take into 
consideration all available hypotheses and should choose the most plausible one among them. 
Here the model invites us to think about the most general and abstract features of linguistic 
theorizing. Given that uncertainty is understood as a pervasive phenomenon in theoretical rea-
soning, Kertész and Rákosi’s approach requires a disengagement from the usual understand-
ing of scientific progress. The most important implication is that the core idea of the model is 
incompatible with “the unreflected and absolutistic defence of particular theories and the un-
reflected and mechanical rejection of their rivals.”8 This understanding has to be replaced by 
another one which emphasizes the open-endedness of object-scientific debates. Although de-
bates in semantics and pragmatics and in other areas improve permanently in their capacity to 
find reassuring answers to troubling questions but they rarely come to an endpoint. Note, 
however, that open-endedness should not be taken as excluding the possibility of theoretical 
progress in linguistics. Indeed, quite the opposite is the case. The fact that the vast majority of 
theoretical claims lack definitive justification has a positive impact on long-run knowledge 
growth because it motivates – or should motivate – everyone to involve more and more data 
into their research and thus to find more plausible solutions to the problems they encounter. 
 
In the light of these metatheoretical considerations, I want to make some final remarks about 
our main topic. First note that two of the central notions of the above model – datum and 
plausibility – have also been used in the previous sections of this paper. This reveals that we 
have applied metatheoretical reflection in our argumentative practices even if only in a theo-
retically innocent or naive way. In their model, Kertész and Rákosi regard metatheoretical re-
flection not as a kind of higher-order reasoning but as an element of object-scientific argu-
mentation. The argumentative style of the present paper seems to support their opinion. More 
importantly, many prominent works of the realism/antirealism debate seem to fit this model as 
well. Although experts rarely explicitly acknowledge the uncertainty, fallibility and revisabil-
ity of their data, the careful manner with which they approach every question suggests that 
they are aware of the relevance of this epistemic factor. This is even more so in the case of 
plausibility. The term ʻplausibility’ is commonly used as if it were a tool for introducing epis-
temic rankings over individual hypotheses. To illustrate this, let us consider some characteris-
tic passages from both sides of the debate. 
It often happens that antirealists about fictional entities use ʻplausibility’ and ʻplausible’ for 
contrasting or ranking hypotheses. Here is a quote from Walton’s book Mimesis as Make-
Believe: 
                                                
8 Kertész & Rákosi (2014a: 7). 
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Language may be essentially a means whereby people communicate with one another; hence the plausi-
bility of basing a theory of language on actions of communicators, language users. To suppose that fiction 
is essentially a means of communication is no more plausible than to suppose it incapable of serving this 
purpose. (Walton 1990: 89, emphasis added) 
Everett uses the adjective ʻ(im)plausible’ in his book The Nonexistent quite frequently.9 Here 
is a typical example: 
I also argued that the most intuitively plausible identity criteria for fictional characters are not those we 
considered that were offered by various fictional realists but rather ones which see the identity or distinct-
ness of fictional characters as being determined by what we are mandated to imagine when we engage 
with the relevant fictions. These criteria are intuitively highly plausible and seem to capture how we actu-
ally talk and think about fictional objects. (Everett 2013: 208, emphasis added) 
In the above passages, both Walton and Everett use composite data sources. The content of 
their claims depends partly on theoretical considerations, and partly on common sense 
knowledge. Accordingly, the role of ʻplausible’ in their sentences consists in qualifying the 
reliability of these data sources. That is, ʻplausible’ functions here like a noun modifier or a 
sentence operator which shows that a particular claim which can be traced back to one data 
source is (much) more acceptable than its rival claim which can be traced back to a different 
source. 
It is not too surprising, I think, that fictional realists apply a similar argumentative strategy 
in their works. Consider the following remarks from Thomasson’s paper Speaking of fictional 
characters: 
Certainly it is plausible that, in writing a work of fiction, the fictionalizing discourse of the storyteller in-
volves a pretense (shared with readers) that she is telling a true story about real people. It’s also plausible 
that internal discourse by readers about the content of the story invokes the same pretense, and can be un-
derstood as discussing what is true according to the story (with the pretense obviating the need to explicit-
ly state this prefix). (Thomasson 2003: 207, emphasis added) 
Thomasson is not the only one to apply the adjective ʻplausible’ to the basic hypotheses of her 
theory. In her paper Fictional realism and negative existentials, von Solodkoff expresses her 
own realist view in the following way: 
Now, I take ʻFictional characters are unreal’, ʻFictional characters are non-existent’, ʻFictional characters 
are not real’ and ʻFictional characters don’t exist’ to be four different ways to convey the same claim. As 
I noted earlier, this seems to be plausible, since ordinary speakers find it extremely natural to switch be-
tween claiming that something ʻis not real’ and claiming that that thing ʻdoesn’t exist’. (von Solodkoff 
2014: 346, emphasis added) 
Note that both of these authors work with data that originate from a direct source. They use 
common sense intuitions for supporting their arguments: Thomasson’s text refers to readers, 
von Solodkoff’s text mentions ordinary speakers. ʻPlausible’ means in their usage that com-
mon sense intuition should be taken as highly reliable data source at a given phase of the ar-
gumentation. 
Of course, trying to demonstrate a general phenomenon with randomly chosen examples 
may seem a little desperate. In response to this it can be said that direct allusions to plausibil-
ity occur in nearly all works of this kind. The examples could be easily multiplied: to talk 
about the plausibility of a claim or hypothesis is the norm rather than exception. And this is 
                                                
9 More precisely, the adjective ʻ(im)plausible’ has exactly 75 occurrences in the text, which means that it oc-
curs, on average, at every third page of the book. 
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enough to show that the expressions ʻp is (highly, extremely, etc.) plausible’ and ʻit is (highly, 
extremely, etc.) plausible that’ are not mere clichés of the language of object-scientific re-
search.10 Instead they are indicators which reveal that the participants of the real-
ism/antirealism debate continuously weigh how reliable the data sources are from which they 
draw their informations. They also show that in order to compare rival hypotheses and theo-
ries and to elaborate alternative explanatory frameworks, researchers have to rely on some 
measure of reliability. 
This is also true of the line of argumentation that has led us to the (NRLR)-based account 
of characters. We have regarded the common sense conception of fictionality as a data source 
with relatively high initial reliability. We then found that artefactualist views are better suited 
for our systematic purposes than antirealist theories. And, finally, we have tried to establish 
that our representationalist framework has numerous compelling advantages over all of the 
existing theories of fictional entities. Plausibility rankings played an often invisible but signif-
icant role at every turn of our argument. Individual claims and hypotheses were accepted only 
if (i) we tacitly assigned them a value which were drawn from a continuum of values between 
that of neutral plausibility (i.e. 0) and certainty (i.e. 1), and (ii) we assigned to their rival 
claims and hypotheses lower values. It would be interesting to see how the assigned plausibil-
ity values are connected to each other and how they fit into our overall representationalist 
framework. The detailed reconstruction of this assignment structure, however, must be the 
subject of another study. 
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